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ABSTRACT. Chomsky has restricted his linguistics to intra-personal language, which he refers to as inner speech. He does not include interpersonal communication or speech acts. But the literature on inner speech shows it to be quite free-form and irregular in both syntax and semantics. It cannot be formalized as Chomsky tries to do. This problem weakens Chomsky’s claim to have found a universal grammar.

Chomsky has restricted his linguistics to language as it is used for thinking, which he recognizes as inner speech. He is not talking about language as communication or as speech acts. As he said in On Nature and Language (2002)

Language is not properly regarded as a system of communication. It is a system for expressing thought, something quite different . . . language use is largely to oneself: “inner speech” for adults, monologue for children. (pp. 76-77)

More recently, in a similar vein, he said

Now let us take language. What is its characteristic use? Well, probably 99.9% of its use is internal to the mind. You can’t go a minute without talking to yourself. It takes an incredible act of will not to talk to yourself. (2012, p. 11)

In addition to concentrating on inner speech, he also restricts his science to linguistic forms or rules. He calls these rules competence as opposed to performance. This is similar to Saussure’s distinction between langue (language) and parole (speech). These then are Chomsky’s starting points.

I will show that these commitments create serious problems for Chomsky’s linguistics. Inner speech is quite irregular, much more so than interpersonal or outer speech. It is also difficult to say there is a “competence” or “langue” dimension for inner speech. The competence aspect is primarily rules, but inner speech, being private, has no audience to carry or enforce the rules. In fact its major rule is efficiency, whatever that might imply for any given individual.
Presumably Chomsky did not intend to create these problems, nor did he foresee them. In 2002 when Chomsky made the foregoing declaration of intent, there had not been a great deal of research on inner speech, and he may have been unfamiliar with the existing literature (see Wiley, 2006 and forthcoming for an overview of this topic, although I have changed my interpretation of Chomsky since my 2006 paper). Still Chomsky had been saying his linguistics concerns language, not as communication but as a tool for thought, for a long time (1966, p. 13; 1975, p. 57).

In addition, his comment on the functions of inner speech ignores its syntactical and semantic oddities.

Actually you can use language even if you are the only person in the universe with language, and in fact it would even have an adaptive advantage. If one person suddenly got the language faculty, that person would have great advantages; the person could think, could articulate to itself its thoughts, could plan, could sharpen, and develop thinking as we do in inner speech, which has a big effect on our lives. Inner speech is most of speech. Almost all the use of language is to oneself. (Chomsky, 2002, p. 148)

In another place Berwick and Chomsky add sleep talk to what constitutes language.

Statistically speaking, for whatever that is worth, the overwhelming use of language is internal – for thought. It takes an enormous act of will to keep from talking to oneself in every waking moment – and asleep as well, often a considerable annoyance. (Berwick & Chomsky, 2011, p. 26, italics added)

I will comment on this addition of sleep talk later.

To return to children’s speech, Chomsky may also have been unfamiliar with the research on children’s monologues, now referred to as “private speech” (Winsler, 2009). This is children’s “thinking out loud” stage, in early childhood. Children’s private speech has many of the same irregularities as adult inner speech. And over time, from ages two to seven or so, this speech does not become less fragmented and ungrammatical. It becomes more so. (Winsler, 2009, p. 8). Usually we think of children’s speech as improving over time, suggesting a tendential movement toward a set of rules. But children’s private speech becomes increasingly deviant from the rules. Obviously the rules are just one force or set of controls and a rather weak one at that.

Regardless of why Chomsky made his statement of intent, it seems to be a poor choice for his linguistics. His theoretical scheme might work for interpersonal speech but it is unrealistically idealized for inner speech. To put it another way inner speech is an anomaly or puzzle, in Thomas Kuhn’s sense, for Chomsky’s linguistic paradigm. (Kuhn, 2012, p. 53)
Politics vs. Linguistic Theory. There are two Chomskys: the one who writes political books and the one who writes on linguistic theory. He thinks the two streams of writing are connected, that his linguistics implies his radical politics. But this seems like a considerable stretch, and few people agree with him (though see Lakoff, 1999, pp, 478-9 for an interesting interpretation).

In this paper I will ignore the ideological Chomsky, except to say that I agree with most of his radical politics and I think he has done the United States a big service by expressing his political views, especially the early ones on the Viet Nam War. I am a huge fan of the radical Chomsky. But that will not keep me from calling them as I see them regarding his linguistics.

Some Examples of Inner Speech

To make my argument I will have to present a fairly comprehensive description of inner speech. Let me begin by presenting three examples of inner speech. This batch of texts is somewhat long, but the best way to discuss inner speech is to have some examples in front of you.

This is a waitress reporting on her thoughts going to work. Her inner speech is presented linguistically along with brief sketches of her imagery.

A great-looking coworker is pouring us coffee. Sounds of a clock chiming five o’clock. “Sure I’d love to go out Friday night” (Caughey, 1984, p. 135. Italics mine.)

A second example is of a girl, a little under two years old, overheard when she was in her bedroom. The researcher sees this as an example of imaginative play. I am including it as an example of Chomsky’s childhood monologue. The girl is just under two years old.

Go Grandma and buy a pretty doll Grandma for me under the bed for me to play the piano... get up clinging, cling-ling-ling. Grandma comes up the steps. Oh, oh, ah, ah, ah, lying on the floor tied up no cap on Theodosia (the doll) lie on the bed, bring yellow sheep to Theodosia, run tap, tap, tap, for Lena. Strawberries, Grandma, wolf lie on bed. Go to sleep darling Theodosia you are my dearest; everybody is fast asleep... A cat came in here, Momma caught it, it had feet and black boots on – short cap, band on it. Poppa ran, the sky – Grandma gone—Grandpa resting. (Singer, 1966, p. 134).

A third example is that of John Johnson (1994), who is illustrating the condensed quality of inner speech. His example is a “to do” list with only three items. “car, dinner, kids.”

He explains the meaning of this string of words as follows:

“Make sure to fill up the car’s gas tank, stop by the store and pick up a gallon of 2% milk and a loaf of whole wheat bread, and be certain to pick up John and Kate from daycare before coming home. (p. 177).

These examples show how inner speech violates the official linguistic rules. Sentences are fragmentary, semantics is irregular and non-linguistic images abound. The waitress shows how inner speech can be full of imagery. Singer’s childhood example shows how both vocabulary and grammar can be irregular and fluid. And Johnson shows how inner speech can be squeezed into a small number of words. Using these examples as a background resource, I will now list the characteristic features of inner speech, drawing on the analysis of Lev Vygotsky (1987). First the syntax and then the semantics.
Syntactically this form of speech is often simplified and abbreviated. Since the subject of the sentence is usually the speaker, and the speaker already knows that he or she is the subject, the subject is usually omitted. This practice is like the use of condensed language in a telegram (or an e-mail or an electronic “text.”) In the telegram, omitting the subject and sometimes other parts of speech saves money. With inner speech it saves time and effort. It also focuses the communication on the essentials.

For Vygotsky the syntax of inner speech is, in his words, “predicated” (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 267). By this he does not mean the predicate of a sentence in the usual sense. He means the thought which answers a question and supplies only the needed information. If the question concerns a time of departure, the predicate might be “eight o’clock.” That would be the whole sentence. If one said (to oneself) “the best time to leave would be eight o’clock” the first seven words would be unnecessary.

If the question were “Why are we selling the house?” you might merely say “money,” rather than “we are selling it to get the money (or because we need money).” A predicated utterance then might omit the subject and possibly also the verb, not to mention possible modifiers. Inner speech’s syntax is stingy, and it does not follow the formal syntax of Chomsky’s model. Inner speech, given its abbreviated form, almost looks like pidgin or creole, but it is always possible to unfold and expand the sentence into grammatically formal language. Still people do not actually do this with inner speech, except when rehearsing a formal statement (e.g. asking the boss for a raise or one’s girlfriend for her hand in marriage).

In the examples, condensation and abbreviation are found throughout. The waitress begins by saying “Only eight minutes. Takes five to change.” Without abbreviation this sentence would read, “I have only eight minutes and it takes five to change clothing.” But the strength of the waitress’s example is the way she shows the interpenetration of ordinary language and imagery. Her semantics is more imagistic than verbal.

Singer’s childhood monologue shows a little girl imagining getting a new doll from her grandma. She is picturing how the toy will bring new life to her bedroom. Her syntax and semantics bend to her imaginative creativity.

John Johnson’s example is a case of a three word utterance, tightly condensed and requiring forty two words to unfold.

Turning to semantics, inner speech has unique ways of handling meaning, again well described by Vygotsky. He has a complex explanation of inner speech’s semantics, usefully summarized by John Johnson (Johnson, 1994). He sees two broad features in Vygotsky’s explanation: semantic embeddedness and egocentricity.
Semantic embeddedness means a word can have a bigger variety of meanings than it has in ordinary, interpersonal speech. It is embedded in a wide batch of meanings. Ordinarily “dinner” simply means the evening meal. But in inner speech it can have overtones and specifications, such as a particular item for an entrée, a special guest, a celebration, this or that restaurant, who’s cooking?, early or late?, who’s on a diet? And so on. Embeddedness means the vocabulary uses the principle of “a little can go a long way.” With a small, but highly flexible and stretchable batch of words, we can say (to ourselves) almost anything we want. One’s inner speech vocabulary is much smaller than one’s outer speech vocabulary. This means the semantics of inner speech is different from the semantics of outer or interpersonal speech.

George Herbert Mead, the pragmatist philosopher, referred to inner speech’s small vocabulary as follows:

The mechanism that we use for this process is words, vocal gestures. And we need, of course, only a very few of these as compared to those we need when talking to others. A single symbol is enough to call out necessary responses. But it is just as real a conversation in terms of significant symbols of language as if the whole process were expressed. We sometimes do our thinking out loud, in fully organized sentences; and one’s thought can always presumably be developed into a complete grammatical unit. That is what constitutes thinking (Mead, 1936, p 381).

Chomsky does not seem to be aware that the vocabulary of inner speech is significantly smaller than our interpersonal vocabulary. Also this vocabulary seems to be mostly nouns and verbs with few other parts of speech. If Chomsky had inner speech in mind in his review of Skinner’s book On Language (Chomsky, 1959) his claim that speakers can form an indefinite or infinite number of sentences from their vocabulary might have to be toned down a bit, given the limited size of inner speech’s vocabulary.

Saussure’s associative axis is helpful here (1959, pp. 122-127). He had two axes for a sentence. The one he called syntagmatic was merely the syntactical unfolding of a sentence, going from subject to predicate. But what he called the associative axis was the set of meanings that might be suggested by the actual words in a sentence, even though these words were not chosen and remained in the background. This axis was a collection of related meanings, i.e. both similar and contrastive, that hovered over a sentence’s core meanings. He thought only in terms of similar meanings, those that could be substituted for the meanings actually used. But I think contrasting or opposite terms also belong on this axis. “I’m tired and want to go to bed” could have an associative axis in which words like “weary, exhausted, beat and bushed” might surround the word “tired.” Also such contrasting words as “energetic, alive and fresh”
might be present as opposites. This embedding gives the inner speech semantics a fluttery, epistemologically labile quality.

The egocentricity of inner speech’s vocabulary, to turn to Johnson’s second point, refers to the way words can be individualized and hooked to the speaker. The meaning has the speaker’s self or “ego” at the “center” and is thus “egocentric.” Here is an example:

I once knew a guy named "Tom," and he had the most engaging, trust-inspiring smile. All he had to do was flash that smile, and I would believe anything he said. The smile was so powerful I had to be betrayed about a half dozen times before I got the point. Then I realized the smile, sucker as I was for it, was a big lie and his major weapon for getting what he wanted. Now, in my mental wanderings I sometimes hear myself saying "he’s another Tom," or simply the condensed and highly egocentric "Tom!" (Example used previously in Wiley, 2006, p. 339).

A peculiarity of inner speech semantics that Vygotsky did not mention is that imagery can function linguistically and syntactically in inner speech. It is well known that some people sometimes think, not in words but in such media as sounds, numbers, visuals, colors, tastes and odors, tactile feelings, kinesthetics and emotions. The waitress’s text is full of imagistic thinking,

These images can be placed into syntactical slots, such as subjects and objects, and function as though they were words (Bickerton, 1995, p. 106). For example I can say “I’d like a burger” by adding the visual image of a hamburger to the words “I’d like a.” Or I could drop the subject and the article, just saying the word “like” and then adding the image of the burger. I could even drop “like” and just produce the feeling of wanting a burger. This would create the single-element sentence of “wannaburger” which combines the hunger impulse with a sizzling burger.

A moment’s thought shows that there are an indefinite number of ways we can form inner speech utterances that combine imagery and words -- or even work solely with imagery. When we do this in our minds the discourse is often so complex, fast, “non-cognitive” (so to speak) and semi-unconscious that it is difficult to catch. Still, this is how the human animal seems to work and it means that inner speech is, in some ways, more complicated than outer speech.

There is also a phonetic peculiarity to inner speech. Obviously imagery is non-verbal and therefore has no phonetic presence. This gives inner speech a phonetic contrast to outer speech. In addition Vygotsky (1987) points out that we often “think” the words rather than pronouncing them in our minds. “We never have the need to pronounce the word fully in inner speech” (p. 275). This imagining instead of
pronouncing the word is another phonetic idiosyncrasy of inner speech. Chomsky’s phonetics would not work for these idiosyncrasies (Chomsky, 2006, pp. 107-109).

Earlier I mentioned that Chomsky includes sleep talk in his definition of language. Most people never hear sleep talk except from their spouse, their lover or someone in their family. The sleep researchers say that sleep talk is usually quite fragmentary, often limited to a single word and frequently too mumbly to understand. The example I will use is from a sleep laboratory, recorded while an experimental subject, a college English student, was sleeping. The experimenter whispered the subject’s name (“David”) into his ear, and, in his sleep, the subject uttered these words.

David – I day David that you – that’s you that day –
dated – day – dravid – dave dravid about 25 or 30
naked naked day dreams – the second dream tie
it all up – you kept bouncing them on – you kept
bouncing them on and on as if you had a regular

This text seems to follow no linguistic rules, neither interpersonal nor intrapersonal. Perhaps there is a language to the unconscious and David is speaking in that medium. In any event Chomsky’s idea, assuming he was serious, that sleep talk can be included under his definition of language seems unreasonable.

A Possible Objection. Interpersonal or outer speech is full of errors. The linguist abstracts from the errors and just uses the pure rules, as in Chomsky’s competence. Aren’t my examples of irregularities in inner speech also just errors, and cannot Chomsky simply say his system of rules is an abstraction from these errors, just as it is an abstraction from the errors of interpersonal speech?

One could call the irregularities of inner speech errors, but I think it makes more sense to call them linguistic innovations. Inner speech comes close to being a language of its own. These innovations are a second set of rules, superimposed on the ordinary rules of outer language. Vygotsky’s predication, for example, which results in an abbreviated syntax, is a linguistic rule.

When you have two sets of rules, one stacked on top of the other, it is difficult to identify nonconformity or error. You need a third set of rules or agreements that sort out the conflicts between the two existing sets of rules. Since the two sets of rules contradict each other to some extent, it would be arbitrary to say which form of rule violation is an error. This would make it impossible to just abstract from the errors, however we define errors, and conclude that Chomsky’s rules prevail.
While it is true that ordinary speech works within a network of rules, inner speech works within a more complicated set of controls. This set of controls might better be called a “field” (Fligstein, 2001) than a set of rules.

The most pressing control is what can merely be called efficiency. Inner speech works without an audience, except for the person doing the internal talking. This lack of an audience weakens the interpersonal linguistic rules. The special rules, identified by Vygotsky, which operate to steer our inner speech, are all of an efficiency nature. So, this field has two sets of linguistic rules, the most distinctive and pressing being those that we form to speed up and economize in the inner theater.

In addition there are at least two more controls in the inner speech field. One is our emotions. Inner speech is much more emotional than outer speech. In fact when we rehearse outer speech by first saying something internally, we usually tone down and repress our emotions. But when we just speak to ourselves without any outer speech our emotions run rampant. This theater is private, and no one but ourselves will witness our feelings.

Still another set of controls over inner speech is the unconscious, using this term for the classical emotional unconscious rather than the recently popularized cognitive unconscious (Hassin et. al., 2005). The unconscious may have its own language, or at least it might code its feelings and meanings in linguistic media. Inner speech is often close to the unconscious. Certainly the sleep talk that Chomsky seems to include in his notion of inner speech is saturated with the emotions of the unconscious.

**Conclusion**

I have now shown that Chomsky’s attempt to make a linguistics of inner speech does not recognize the difficulties of this medium. Inner speech is much more complex and irregular than he seems to think. I will not present my conclusions as definite “implications.” Rather they are things to think about.

One is that Chomsky may have taken a wrong turn. Inner speech does not seem to work for his analysis. Rather he might better have focused on ordinary interpersonal language and speech acts. On the other hand this refocusing might require greater attention to the social factor in language and to actual speech as opposed to competence.

If Chomsky is serious about defining language as inner speech, he needs to rethink the semantic and syntactic peculiarities that Vygotsky discovered. At present these peculiarities are anomalies and stand in contradiction to Chomsky’s theory.

Another trait of inner speech that stands in Chomsky’s way is its dialogicality. Chomsky treats his linguistics, concentrating on inner speech, as non-dialogical. But inner speech is inherently dialogical (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 293). To pretend otherwise is to ignore much of its meaning.
If linguistics were transformed into a less formal and perhaps multi-paradigmatic discipline, the humanities and the other social sciences would applaud. In the least, opening a window would be most welcome. Linguistics has been too isolated for too long.

References


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DIALOGICAL TENSIONS IN HEROIC MILITARY AND MILITARY-RELATED MORAL INJURY

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ABSTRACT. In recent years, greater attention has been provided to military-related moral injury as an important risk factor for the mental health of Veterans. As research into moral injury is still in its nascent stages, this area of inquiry would be bolstered by additional theoretical accounts of moral injury’s detrimental effects on psychological well-being. To this end, Hubert Hermans’ theory of the dialogical self is applied to moral injury in male Veterans with an emphasis on understanding how the interplay of cultural myths and masculine identities may combine to make Servicemen deployed in the theatre of war more vulnerable to moral injury. Specific emphasis is given in reviewing how the mythological figure of the hero informs both military culture and hegemonic masculine ideals and fuses them into the westernized soldier-hero figure. It is argued that male Veterans who identify strongly with this soldier-hero figure may be ill equipped to face the moral uncertainties presented by war. Quotations of Veterans from published empirical and clinical sources are then used to demonstrate how identification with the soldier-hero figure may put male Veterans at risk for moral injury. Finally, clinical recommendations are provided for clinicians seeking to assist Veterans recovering from combat-related moral injury.

Keywords: dialogical self, masculinity, moral injury, military Veterans, combat trauma

The armed global conflicts of the past decade have once again brought into focus the needs of Veterans coping with the sequelae of warfare. Among these concerns are trauma-related diagnoses such as posttraumatic stress disorder and major depression (Gaderman et al, 2012; Smith et al., 2009). Additionally, recent discussions of Veteran mental health have increasingly included military-related moral injury as a psychological risk-factor. Litz et al. (2009) define moral injury as “perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness to, or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations” (p. 700). The domain of morally injurious acts includes events such as firing on other combatants, allowing the abuse of civilians, failing to save com-

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rades from death or injury, taking the life of non-combatants (including women and children), and the commission of atrocities (i.e., disfigurement of corpses, torture, etc.).

Numerous studies have documented the detrimental effects of direct participation in war-related violence. Killing in combat and involvement in atrocities have been associated with greater risk of suicide (Hendin, 1991), posttraumatic stress disorder (Maguen, 2009) major depressive disorder (Marx, 2010) and negative religious coping (Witvliet, 2004). Even when controlling for combat exposure, studies confirm that the degree of involvement in wartime atrocities continues to predict PTSD symptom severity (Beckham 1998; McNair, 2002). However, despite these findings the majority of treatment approaches for military trauma explicitly focus on symptomatic level fear-conditioning and information processing models of trauma (Foa, Steketee & Rothbaum, 1989; Resick, Monson & Chard, 2008), leaving unaddressed trauma caused by transgressing expectations of oneself as a moral agent. Attention to these self-perceptions is relevant to interventions for Veterans given that Litz et al. (2009) have highlighted spiritual and social elements as being important sources of recovery from moral injury. Although new approaches are being pioneered for containing and mitigating the effects of moral injury (Steenkamp, 2011), efforts at long-term repair may be aided by a theoretical understanding of how military-related moral injuries impact the soldier’s experience of self, thereby contributing to the clinical syndromes cited above. Hubert Hermans’ (2003) theory of the dialogical self, with its emphasis on a multiplicity of autonomous interacting voices, represents a highly useful framework for understanding how contrasting individual, social and cultural forces contribute to and are affected by military-related moral injury.

Although moral injury is by no means restricted to male Service members, the vast majority of military personnel are male. Therefore, the vast majority of Veterans experiencing and seeking treatment for military-related psychological complaints are likewise male (Seal, 2010). Furthermore, as will be discussed in later sections it has been widely accepted that military institutions and their associated cultures have historically been dominated by masculine ethos and stereotypes (Goldstein, 2001). The prevalence of masculine themes and traits in these cultures therefore requires that any application of the dialogical self to military populations will take into account how military culture defines and enacts masculine traits and behaviors. Such an undertaking can be facilitated, not only by a review of masculine ideology in military contexts, but by a wider understanding of how masculinity and military identities are situated within cultural mythology.

Heroes and Militarized Masculinity

One cultural narrative that bears particular salience for military masculinities and military-related moral injury is the hero myth. In his classic text, The Hero with a Thousand Faces, Joseph Campbell (1972) documents the consistency of the hero
mythos across time and cultures. He notes that in many ancient tales of heroism, the hero is either the offspring of or commissioned by divine powers, and so is imbued with more noble and powerful qualities than weaker mortals. He argues that the figure of the Hero is a central human theme that symbolizes “the divine creative and redemptive image hidden within all of us” (p. 39) and so serves to inspire individuals and societies. Other authors have similarly commented on the importance of the hero figure in constructing cultural identity. Porpora (1996) argued that by conferring hero status on individuals or groups, societies identify an “idealized reference group” (p. 211) which is used “to tell ourselves what it is we stand for” (p. 211). In addition to serving as idealizations of cultural values, Boon (2005) has observed that hero figures also function as social referents against which individual members of cultures can measure themselves. Thus, individuals may not only praise and worship their cultural hero figures; they may also use them as a means of locating themselves along dimensions of valued traits and characteristics. These characteristics may include such cultural values as personal integrity, good character, moral certitude and selflessness. Thus, hero figures both define cultural values and evaluate the individual’s alignment with such definitions.

Perhaps not coincidentally, many of the traits traditionally ascribed to heroic acts (stoicism, physical strength, fearlessness, prowess in combat) have also been traditionally held as masculine ideals. Drawing from Connell’s (1995) concept of hegemonic masculinity, Barrett (2001) identifies Western culture’s ideal man as one “who is independent, risk-taking, aggressive, heterosexual and rational” (p. 79). It is important to note that such idealized traits are partially grounded in both biological and social influences. Goldstein (2001) has reviewed how the increased presence of the hormone testosterone in males increases body size and muscle mass, thereby providing some biological bases for more physical heroic qualities. Goldstein argues that it is against the backdrop of these biological dispositions that the heroic qualities of stoicism and proclivity to violence are fostered through social influences such as male-male competition, social reinforcement and shaming. He further notes that these social influences reciprocally increase testosterone levels, thereby potentially amplifying the intensity of aggressive behavior. It is this coalescing of biological and social influences that leads Boon (2005) to describe the traditional hero figure as the “hyperbole” of masculine characteristics (p. 307). As a powerful “metanarrative” (Boon, 2005) for both defining and locating oneself within one’s own culture, the hero figure, with its biological ties to the masculine gender, provides western males with a highly accessible tool for understanding and defining their own masculine identities.

In addition to its role as creating social referents for masculinity, the hero myth provides members of a particular culture with a sense of safety and protection. Boon (2005) points out that the need for heroes is rooted in the desire for members of a community to feel protected from external threats and to stave off awareness of death
and mortality. With such purposes, it is natural for the hero to often be identified with institutions and individuals whose overt roles resemble this protective function. Military institutions, with their arsenals of powerful weapons, patriotic ideologies, and hierarchical command structures provide a natural fit for serving the hero myth’s function of providing its believers with a sense of safety and protection. In this relationship, the military epitomizes the virtues of the heroic protector, courageously defending its citizens from the evils of an identified enemy force. In return, the protected public legitimizes the military’s strength and essential goodness through celebration and veneration of the hero’s role. Higate and Hopton (2005) argue that support for “military organizations, military successes, military pageantry, and rituals...represent the public endorsement of such values and their institutionalization in national culture” (p. 433; see also Dawson, 1994). Higate and Hopton (2005) further point out that this close relationship between the military and masculinity is reciprocal in nature. On one hand, masculine ideologies which valorize strong active males have been used to incite military actions; whereas on the other hand military institutions have cultivated images of the stoic, brazen and violent soldier which reinforce hegemonic masculine traits in civilian culture. Thus, military and masculine ideologies can and often do mutually reinforce one another.

Due to the confluence of the masculinized hero myth and male-dominated military institutions, the militarized hero figure has come to be synonymous with idealized masculinity in U.S. culture. The military has been considered by some to be the most forceful institution in constructing images of masculinity in U.S. society at large (Klein, 1999). For American culture, the soldier-hero figure embodies the essence of traditional male sex role attitudes and behavior wherein effeminate tendencies in men are eliminated. In controlling this discourse, military culture not only reserves for itself the ability to judge who is and is not a man, it also promises the ability to create men from mere boys through rites of passage (Goldstein, 2001). As eloquently stated by one author,

The soldier hero has proved to be one of the most durable and powerful forms of idealized masculinity within Western cultural traditions since the time of the Ancient Greeks. Military virtues such as aggression, strength, courage and endurance have repeatedly been defined as the natural and inherent qualities of manhood, whose apogee is attainable only in battle. Celebrated as a hero in adventure stories telling of his dangerous and daring exploits, the soldier has become a quintessential figure of masculinity. (Dawson, 1994; as cited in Persson, 2012, pp. 133)

The notion of manhood being obtained through battle epitomizes the melding of the hero myth and military ideals into the figure of the soldier-hero, who defines himself by the ability to subdue the clearly defined evils of his enemy through physical force. This description highlights the soldier-hero identity as depending not only on the
traits of strength, stoicism and virtue, but also requiring an immoral antagonist against which these traits can be directed in a morally virtuous and unequivocal manner.

Boon (2005) has argued that the most recent cultural revitalization of the hero metanarrative in American culture took place following the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. Following the attacks, the sitting U.S. president saw approval ratings increase from 51% on September 10, 2001 to 81% on September 15, 2001, reflecting the need of American citizens to reestablish hero figures in the face of threat (Hetherington & Nelson, 2003). The aftermath of the terrorist attacks also provided opportunities to bestow hero status on the first responders who rushed to the site of the damage (Anker, 2006). As soon as military operations began in Iraq and Afghanistan, American military members were also included within this reinvigorated hero metanarrative (Anker, 2006; Boon, 2005).

The Dialogical Self

The hero myth provides societies with protective cultural figures which also serve as reference points for males to evaluate their own masculine identity within their respective cultures. As the quintessential magnification of masculine qualities, it is likely that military institutions and their Servicemen will identify, whether overtly or implicitly, with the soldier-hero myth. Although this identification serves important functions, it also presents Servicemen (and U.S. culture more broadly) with challenges when faced with the morally ambiguous context of war. Moral injury following combat and involvement in other war-related violence may challenge the soldier-hero identity fostered by the dominant narratives of military culture. When confronted with military-related moral injury, masculine identities rooted in these popular and institutionalized conceptions of the heroic soldier may face a crisis of meaning and dislocation from their preferred roles. Consequently, attempts to assist soldiers and Veterans in restoring meaning and stability to their personal narratives requires that adequate attention be paid to the ways in which the soldier’s personal identity, social networks, and surrounding culture influence and are influenced by moral injury.

Hermans’ (2003) theory of the dialogical self provides a rich and insightful framework for understanding the conflict posed by moral injury for heroic, militarized masculinities. Before applying the dialogical self to military-related moral injury, it is important to review key elements of the Hermans’ theory. First and foremost, Hermans’ theory of the dialogical self posits an “extended self” which is in contrast to the enclosed self assumed by many psychological frameworks. In the extended dialogical self, there is no clear boundary between the inside and the outside of the mind. The self and its contents are radically open and accessible to the world and the various social and cultural voices present therein. The collection of these utterances and perspectives, known individually as “positions,” constitute a decentralized self with many different, relatively autonomous, voices existing within it simultaneously. Hermans terms the
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collection of these positions within the self’s psychological space a “repertoire.” Repertoires, although composed of separate autonomous positions, are united by the individual’s personal sense of temporal continuity. Thus, the multitude of different voices that comprise a given individual are nonetheless experienced as a single continuous consciousness.

In delineating among voices within a given individual’s repertoire, Hermans (2003) uses William James (1890) distinction of the “I” and the “Me” as corresponding with internal and external repertoire positions. Internal positions correspond to James’ “I” and are those voices serving as the person’s sense of self-as-knower (e.g., I as a father, I as a leader, I as a soldier). In contrast, external positions correspond to James’ “Me” and are those voices appropriated to or belonging to the person in some way. Importantly, external positions include all such relationships of ownership, both positive (i.e., “my friend”) and negative (i.e., “my enemy”) and develop whenever an individual meaningfully perceives and engages with another self. Additionally, the dialogical self includes within its repertoire of external positions the collective voices of larger social structures, such as groups, institutions and cultures (Herman, 2003). As the dialogical self is constituted by relatively autonomous voices, the boundaries between internal and external positions will vary fluidly between and within persons by context, necessitating that any understanding of an individual be grounded in a holistic recognition of the situation under consideration.

Finally, dialog which occurs among the positions within the self can be understood in terms of exchange and power (Hermans, 2004). Dialogical relations are always more or less asymmetrical with regard to the power invested in one position over another at any given time. However, strong asymmetries in power decrease dialog between positions and the potential for adaptive innovations. As far as one position silences the voice of another, the self is deprived of the richness and flexibility that comes from a diversity of perspectives. The power organization of positions in the dialogical self can be more precisely understood in terms spatial movements (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010). Progressive/regressive movements refer to the self’s ability to understand itself in new, more insightful, ways, with regression occurring when the core discourses among positions are disrupted and the individual experiences concomitant tension and ambiguity in self-understanding. In contrast, centralizing/decentralizing movements refer to the role of certain positions in defining the self as a coherent whole and in prescribing congruent courses of action for the self. Decentralizing movements occur when previously core positions are dislodged from their guiding positions and relocated towards the periphery of the self. In the cases of both regression and decentralization, the individual is likely to experience significant anxiety and distress as the continuity of their preferred personal discourse is threatened. However, these movements also provide opportunity for reorganization of the self if
new dialogs can be formed between positions in the self that allow for flexible and constructive responses to the changing environment (Kahn, Preiss, & Hermans, 2012).

**Dialogical Tensions in Military-Related Moral Injury**

Soldiers whose internal and external repertoires strongly reflect a militarized heroic masculinity may be at particular risk for destabilization of the self when faced with moral injury. In the dialog between positions of the soldier-hero masculine identity, the traits of stoicism, discipline, and a clear moral imperative to engage clear enemy threats are likely to take a central role in defining the individual as both a man and as a soldier. However, research findings clearly document that the taking of life in combat is often accompanied by substantial emotional strain and ambiguity (Maguen, 2009). Within a dialogical self framework, engagement in morally injurious acts (and the psychological reactions that often flow from them) can be seen as decentralizing these dominant themes of a militarized heroic masculinity, thereby destabilizing the soldier’s repertoire and creating intense psychological tension and distress. Furthermore, if the positions within the soldier’s repertoire fail to form new discourses concerning the soldier’s actions in war, the result could be a dramatic regression in self-understanding and a concomitant sense that the soldier has, in a very real way, lost himself to the war. In a preliminary attempt to draw support for this proposition, numerous quotations from combat Veterans and clinical observations will be presented to illustrate the impact of moral injury on the combat Veteran’s sense of self.

**Moral Injury as Self-Estrangement**

A common observation of both combat Veterans and war scholars is that war often involves the dehumanizing of enemy combatants and cultures (Dewey, 2004; Shay, 1994). Hermans (2003) has noted that when this dehumanization occurs, the dialog between the internal I-position “I as a soldier” and the external position “my enemy” becomes extremely asymmetrical and power-laden, such that there is little or no opportunity for meaningful exchange. Dewey (2004) points out how propaganda has historically facilitated this dehumanization as a way to mobilize the nation’s resources for conflict. The characterization of combatants as “Gooks,” “Japs,” “Krauts,” or “Ragheads” preserves the moral purity of the militarized hero in destroying an enemy who is perceived as being wholly other and therefore not deserving of the same protection granted to the soldier-hero’s own culture members.

Prescriptions from within military culture through soldier-to-soldier interactions may also reinforce this dehumanization of the enemy, and thus, the preservation of the hero myth. Wikler (1980) shares a Veteran’s account of the punishment he received by grieving over his first killing experience in combat,

The first time I killed … the first time I shot someone over in Vietnam, I dropped my gun, fell to my knees, and started crying ‘cause I had shot
somebody...it happened so fast and I didn’t realize what I had done. I stayed like that on my knees for a minute or so, then he [the sergeant] came up and kicked me in the butt and told me to get up. (Wikler, 1980, p. 94)

Such instances are not exceptional. As one former U.S. Veteran told the author, it was often ingrained in soldiers that when firing on an enemy combatant, “all you should feel is recoil.” Although this message speaks to the importance of preventing potentially disastrous hesitation in combat situations, the stripping of pity or compassion for fallen enemy combatants also commands soldiers to absolve themselves from the emotions of guilt or shame that could indicate moral culpability for taking the life of another human being.

Dewey (2004) contrasts this dehumanization of the enemy through war propaganda with the sudden re-humanization than can occur during and after combat. He relates the story of one Veteran who, having just participated in the sinking of a Japanese ship recognized the human plight of the sailors destined to end their lives in shark infested waters. Dewey writes, “As the ‘mass of people’ looked up at him, he felt “sudden sympathy for their helplessness.” For him a “hated enemy” had “become a pitied human being” (p. 32). In a similar account, Dewey relates a combat situation in which, after days of intense fighting, a handful of Japanese infantrymen charged a U.S. soldier’s machine gun position in broad daylight. The soldier dispatched the Japanese men quickly and easily with his weapon. When all was clear, he approached the bodies with his comrades to collect souvenirs. Dewey quotes the U.S. soldier as to what happened next,

First we found they had no ammo. All their rifles were empty. They had used us to commit suicide rather than surrender. Then I made the biggest mistake I ever made in war. I pulled the wallet out of one man’s pocket and opened it. Inside was a picture of a beautiful young woman and a little girl, about the same age as my wife and daughter. That image has haunted me to this day. (Dewey, 2004, p. 32)

In these cases, the soldiers’ moral injury occurred, not during the act of killing itself, but after as the external and dehumanized “my enemy” position shifted to resemble with the soldier’s own internal I-positions. For these soldiers, what had before the incidents been “my enemy” now had become both “my fellow human being” and “my victim.” Thus, from the perspective of the dialogical self, these instances of moral injury can be understood as a rapid centralization of the “my enemy” external position, challenging the previously asymmetrical dialog which had initially enabled the violence to occur.

Tragically, it is often only after lethal actions have been taken that soldiers are confronted with this reorganization of their repertoires. Dewey (2004) quotes the experience of a WWII marine rifleman who, sifting through papers of a dead Japanese soldier, came across a wallet stuffed with family pictures.
At that moment, for the first time in the war, I felt pity for the enemy. On Peleliu we had seen few enemy dead. They had been dragged into caves by their mates or sealed in bunkers by our demolitionists. On Okinawa I had seen hundreds of dead, but I felt nothing toward them until we searched the Japanese in the gully and found the pictures of his wife and child. Then I realized that we were killing other humans who fathered children and had parents who loved them, just as we had... From that day in the rain I never again hated the Japanese. I just wished that the war would end so we could stop killing each other. (Dewey, 2004, p. 33)

As evidenced from these separate accounts of moral injury, a specific concern for male Veterans may be identifying with the masculine identities of combatants they have killed. As a part of suddenly recognizing the enemy as human, Veterans are also confronted with the parallels between the social roles of their enemies and of themselves. The rehumanization of the slain enemy brings the victim into close proximity with valued positions in the surviving soldier’s internal repertoire (e.g., I as a husband, I as a father), throwing into question the soldier-hero’s clear moral imperative distinguishing his own noble cause from the evil intentions of the enemy. The dissonance created by the soldier knowing that he has not only taken a human life but deprived another man of his own masculine roles may, as it seems to have done for these soldiers, disrupt previously held moral justifications for his violent acts. Without a firm imperative legitimizing his behavior, the soldier may be left unprepared to grapple with the moral ambiguity of warfare.

For other Veterans, the taking of life in combat may more explicitly challenge notions of manhood and adjacent social identities. Wikler (1980), in studying the effects of combat on Vietnam Veteran’s self-concepts, reports the following story of a Veteran who, following his first killing of another human, openly challenged his superior officer’s valorization of the masculine soldier-hero.

Well, lieutenant, I guess this means I’m a man now, huh? ...to be a marine means like doin’ well in combat, it makes you a man. When I said that to him, as a sarcastic remark, because I sure didn’t feel like I had done anything great, I sure didn’t feel like I had become a man.” He told me I had to search the guy...I was looking through the guy’s wallet, you know, and I saw a picture of his wife and a picture of girls and guys with writing on them, you know, like a school picture trip... and I just said, wow, this guy was a real live human being. And it made me realize, you know, how totally screwed up being a human being is. It’s just a bunch of bulls----...I don’t think human beings are less of an animal than a tiger. (Wikler, 1980, p. 95, italics in original)
From this quote it can be seen that moral injury can occur as a simultaneous disruption of the self on a number of different levels. For this Veteran, the act of killing challenged his identity as both a marine and a man, leaving him with a sense of betrayal and disillusionment. Secondly, the Veteran notes the fallen enemy’s social identity as a husband and classmate, implicitly paralleling the Veteran’s own experience with those social roles. Finally, the Veteran expresses a deeper dislocation from his sense of humanity as a whole. The disturbance caused by taking human life, even in socially sanctioned military combat, was so great as to lead the Veteran to animalize human nature, thereby questioning the legitimacy of human morality as a whole.

As the foregoing quotations demonstrate, the soldier-hero myth can be ill prepared to grapple with the sudden realization that enemy combatants are more alike than different from the soldier’s own self. It is likely that the way combat Veterans cope with this realization will vary from soldier to soldier. However, given the extreme challenges to the self posed by moral injury, it is likely that many Veterans may resort to extreme measures in order to preserve stability amongst their internal and external repertoires. For some Veterans, the divergence of their actions in combat and their preferred civilian discourses may lead them to compartmentalize their behavior during deployment and non-deployment periods among entirely different selves. As one soldier described,

I was just a typical American boy… I wasn’t no angel [before Vietnam], either. I mean, I had my little fistfights and stuff. I was, you’re only human. But evil didn’t enter it till Vietnam. I mean real evil. I wasn’t prepared for it all... It was all evil. All evil. Where before, I wasn’t. I look back, I look back today, and I’m horrified at what I turned into. What I was. What I did. I just look at it like it was somebody else. I really do. It was somebody else. Somebody had control of me. (Shay, 1994, pp. 32-33)

In this quote, a shift in dialog can be observed when the Veteran contrasts his pre-war masculine self and his wartime self. Whereas this Veteran considered his pre-Vietnam self as a flawed but unquestioningly human youth, the self presented by his actions in war is in such horrific contrast that the Veteran makes no attempt at reconciling them. Instead, the “I as evil” position is constrained within the context of Vietnam so as to not threaten the humanity of the pre-war, and presumably post-war, self.

This separation of self, though perhaps lacking in dialog between positions, nevertheless may help to preserve the ability of the dialogical self to function in a contextual fashion through asymmetrically limiting the destructive “I as evil” position to the timeframe of deployment. Although Herman (2003) has argued that such contextualized fluctuations are inherent in the dialogical self, not every Veteran may be able to so completely partition off their dialogical positions so as to prevent cross-contamination of their preferred discourses. Usoof (2011) has observed that one factor
that may increase the probability of this cross-contamination of discourses is the shift Servicemen make from a group-centered combat environment to interpersonally-centered civilian contexts. In interviews with Afghan and Iraq war Veterans, Usoof found that Veterans described combat-related experiences of guilt and shame as being more intense after returning home, corresponding to a shift from group morality to a more interpersonally focused morality. One soldier explained,

You don’t have the luxury of sitting back and contemplating (in the battlefront). I don’t think, in my opinion, the PTSD manifests till soldiers come home and reintegrate into the civilian world with civilian morals and begin to think maybe I shouldn’t have shot at that person or maybe I should have waited or given them another warning. At the time you have the fight or flight mentality. You want to fight, you want to protect your ground and your soldiers. (Usoof, 2011, pp. 29-30)

Thus, when soldiers reenter a civilian context, violence that had been sanctioned within a militarized group mentality now becomes the subject of moral condemnation under an interpersonal civilian mentality. The contradiction created by this shift in moral context further adds to the potential for destabilization of the dialogical self. Take for example the following statement from the documentary film Restrepo (Hetherington & Junger, 2010) in which a Veteran struggles to reconcile the morally conflicting aspects of his self upon returning from deployment,

For a while there, I started thinking that God hates me . . . I’m not religious or anything . . . but I felt like there was this hate for me, because I did sin . . . I sinned, and although I would have done everything the exact same way, I still feel this way. And that’s the terrible thing of war. You do terrible things; then you have to live with them afterwards. But you would do them the same way if you had to go back. So what do you do? It’s an evil, evil, evil thing inside your body: it’s like f—ing good and evil inside there. (Hetherington & Junger, 2010)

In this quotation, the soldier identifies the evil as continuing to exist within his current self – as still being part of him. Although he finds some of his own actions during deployment to be morally repugnant, he also sympathizes with them as a necessary, however terrifying, evil. As a consequence of neither compartmentalizing nor creating a satisfactory dialog between his “I as good” and “I as evil” internal positions, he carries this conflict with him onward from the battlefield and into his civilian life. The ongoing moral dilemma posed by these conflicting injunctions leaves the Veteran in a state of dialogical regression without a satisfactory answer for such basic questions of whether he is fundamentally good or fundamentally evil. Consequently, the male Veteran suffering moral injury has no way to satisfactorily locate himself along the continuum
of heroic qualities that had previously granted him a positive masculine identity as a soldier-hero.

Such identity confusion is compounded by the reactions of friends and loved ones to the Veteran’s experiences, should he decide to share them. As Hermans (2003) points out, “the words of other people, invested with indignation, anger, doubt, anxiety, or pleasure, enter interior dialogues and create an “inner society of voices,” (p. 94). To these sentiments could be added praise, adoration, proclamations of innocence and even hero worship. Though typically regarded as positive, these latter voices may become problematic in the context of Veterans who have come into contact with their own capacity for brutality, and in some cases, evil. Whereas the Veterans may have once been free to receive these voices prior to war as congruent with the soldier-hero masculine identity, there may be little room to reconcile these externally positive appraisals with the internal voices of doubt and culpability in the aftermath of moral injury.

Tritle (2000) relates the account of one mother listening to her son who had recently returned from Vietnam. As her son “recounted one horrific incident after another, sometimes confessing his own brutalities, [she] thought to herself, “This isn’t my son,” (as quoted in Shay, 2002, p. 85). For this mother, the shock experienced by confronting her son’s capacity to engage in violent acts was evidently strong enough to begin challenging whether he still inhabited his previous position within her external repertoire. Tritle continues, “As [her son] continued his confessions, she began to look for birthmarks and childhood scars, to prove to herself that the man sitting before her was an imposter. Quickly her son sensed what she was doing and…‘went off” as he realized that his own mother did not believe or trust him.” This account highlights the potential for interpersonal damage created by moral injury. In addition to disrupting dialog within the soldier’s internal repertoire, moral injury can disrupt the preferred social discourse of war in the soldier’s social network as well, thereby having the potential to alienate him from his extended self. For this Veteran, the task of progressively reorganizing his various positions into a more stable self may have well been hampered by the shock and fear his confessions evoked from his mother. Understanding this interaction through the lens of the dialogical self thus reveals how moral injury is as much an interpersonal affront as it is an intrapsychic wound.

Moral Injury as Cultural Estrangement: Protecting Heroes from Evil

As the hero forms a prominent metanarrative in western culture, the disorienting and painful effects of dislocation from this myth extend beyond those which occur to the individual soldier and their immediate social networks. By providing both safety and a social referent to individuals and cultures at large, the hero myth becomes an important way of organizing and maintaining social order (Boon, 2005). In times of war, the preservation of this order depends on the nation’s ability to justify sometimes
morally ambiguous violence through the vilifying of the enemy and the valorizing of combat (Dewey, 2004). As has been demonstrated in the quotations above, the actual experiences of soldiers in combat often challenge both of these discourses. To the extent that the morally injurious experiences of individual soldiers enter the public’s consciousness, a society may feel compelled to respond in ways that preserve social stability (Shay, 1994).

When the morality of a culture’s hero figures are in question, the first response by culture members may be to deny the existence of a moral infraction (Spector, 2008). A notable example of this cultural bolstering of the hero narrative was observed in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In a controversial report, journalist William Langewiesche claimed to have witnessed evidence of rescue workers looting of the World Trade Center towers sites amid ongoing rescue efforts (Langewiesche, 2002). Despite independent reports of rescue workers engaging in similar looting elsewhere near the site (Chivers, 2001), Langewiesche and his publisher became the focus of protests and harsh criticisms seeking to restore the valor of 9/11 rescue workers (Carr, 2003). Boon (2005) argues that the intense social reaction to Langewiesche’s claims was in part a reflection of American culture’s need to preserve the central role of the hero myth in a time of threat. The example demonstrates the depth of American culture’s dependence on the hero myth in that cognitive dissonance was resolved, not by altering the hero myth to accommodate human failings, but by disputing the corruptibility of the culture’s heroes.

Thus, a society’s dependence on the hero myth to provide itself with a sense of safety may also create an ironic reversal in which it is society that must protect their heroes from the taint of moral imperfections. In the case of military Servicemen, the valorization of soldiers as hero figures may deny some Veterans the cultural permission to function at sub-heroic levels. In this vein, Denton-Borhaug (2012) argues that a culture’s insistence on the moral superiority of soldiers as a form of praise can paradoxically serve to further alienate returning combatants. For these soldiers,

...acknowledging, much less addressing, the moral injury of many returning [home] is made more difficult by the war-culture of a nation bent on sacralizing the necessity of war-as-sacrifice and heaping gratitude upon Service members. Such practices collapse the space necessary to process the deep moral ambiguity of their battle experiences and lives in war’s aftermath. (Denton-Borhaug, 2012, p. 132)

Denton-Borhaug’s choice of wording is appropriate within a dialogical self framework. By reaffirming and attaching the hero mythos to the actions and return of the soldier, cultures stifle opportunities for open dialog concerning the experiences of the male Veteran and their implications for militarized masculinity. As Hermans (2003) has argued that cultures act as collective voices, fulfilling independent positions in the self,
such unilateral affirmations of hero status may create strong asymmetry with the Veteran’s internal positions of “I as a killer,” or “I as a victimizer.” Denton-Borhaug’s argument is reflected in the following quotation from the military documentary Restrepo (Hetherington & Junger, 2010), as one soldier expressed the frustration of having his culture attempt to valorize his actions,

Everyone tells you, “You did an honorable thing. You did all right; you’re all right; you did what you had to do.” And I just hate that comment, “You did what you had to do.” Because I didn’t have to do any of it . . . that’s the hardest thing to deal with. I didn’t have to do s--; I didn’t have to join the army . . . But I did. And that comment, “You did what you had to do,” just drives me insane. Because is that what God’s gonna say: “You did what you had to do”? “Good job”? F—ing punch you on the shoulder and say, “Welcome to heaven”? I don’t think so. (Hetherington & Junger, 2010)

Cultural insistence on a morally sanitized soldier-hero figure thus encourages a monologue in favor of the culture’s needs and preferences, and inhibits the Veteran’s dialogical self from adaptively reorganizing around the moral injury. Instead, Veterans like the one quoted above may experience intensely discrepant discourses emanating from their internal and external positions, resulting in psychological distress, confusion and difficulty forming a coherent self with which to interact socially and culturally.

As has been argued thus far, the valorizing of the combat soldier into a hero figure is as much a function of society’s need to feel protected as it is a way to create exemplary templates for masculinity. However, the ability of U.S. culture to valorize its soldier-heroes has been substantially challenged in the latter half of the 20th century. It has been well documented that whereas the American Veterans of WWII had been granted heroic status by U.S. culture by virtue of their participation in a “good war,” many soldiers returning from Vietnam encountered public criticism of the military and widespread media coverage of atrocities committed by U.S. soldiers (Spector, 2008). Furthermore, increased journalistic coverage of the war and atrocities committed by U.S. soldiers brought to the forefront of American consciousness the brutality and moral uncertainty of warfare, thereby fueling anti-war movements (Hagopian, 2009; Hammond, 1998).

In this setting, where the moral limitations of hero figures are so evident so as to make it impossible for the host culture to dispute them, an even stronger reaction than denial may ensue. Rather than contaminate the hero, culture members may displace the soldier-hero from his revered position and esteem him instead as a monster. Kipniss (1994) in his analysis of masculinity in recent popular film draws parallels between the two classic figures of the hero and the monster. Kipniss notes that the “monster lives hidden in the shadow of the hero and, as such, shares many of the hero's characteristics. The monster is strong, purposeful, fearless, and practically invincible in battle” (p. 42).
Where these figures differ is simply the application of their masculine characteristics for good or evil, with monsters channeling the virtuous traits of the hero "in the direction of destroying life" (p. 43).

The most classic American depiction of this masculine monster may be the cultural icon of Rambo. In his initial film appearance (Feitshans & Kotcheff, 1982), the character of John Rambo is characterized as a hyper-masculine but troubled Vietnam Veteran who, as a result of his own history of military trauma and mistreatment from local law enforcement, loses touch with his civilian self and focuses his military combat skills on civilian authorities and terrifying a small town. Through his undisciplined and misdirected use of military force, Rambo forfeits a crucial element of the heroic myth, yet still retaining all the lethality of an experienced and trained warrior (Goldstein, 2001). In this way, the masculine monster is portrayed, not necessarily as seeking to destroy that which is good, but simply in lacking firm ties to conventional morality that would enable him to peacefully coexist in and protect civilian society. Fittingly, the film ends with Rambo finally allowing himself to be arrested and escorted off to confinement, thereby acknowledging his incompatibility with human society.

Kipness (1994) argues that by presenting men with an exaggerated form of violent masculine heroes in the media, U.S. culture also paradoxically strengthens the figure of the masculine monster. In maintaining the morally pristine and violent hero, the primary alternative of the equally violent yet morally depraved monster is also necessarily preserved. Kipniss argues that avoiding this destructive dichotomy requires U.S. culture to become aware of and reconnect with the masculine capacities for both good and evil and find ways to transcend aggression (physically or socially) as a primary form of self-enhancement. In this way, the soldier-hero and its implicit masculine monster can both be recognized as legitimate aspects of the self that coexist in a balanced tension with one another.

**Moral Injury and the Dialogical Self in Psychotherapy**

Along with clarifying moral injury’s effects on the masculine soldier-hero identity, Hermans’ theory of the dialogical self also offers insights for aiding male Veterans in their recovery from war. Hermans (2003) has outlined three ways the dialogical self changes – the creation of dialogical space, innovations to the self, and the development of a meta-position. Each of these processes will be reviewed and applied to moral injury in the context of male Veterans.

As compared to other therapeutic approaches which attempt to silence purportedly pathogenic cognitions, interventions based in dialogical self theory do not consider removing such phenomena essential for recovery. Instead, the dialogical self is grounded in “a basis of normative functioning” (Hermans & Dimaggio, 2004, p. 3), meaning that it assumes the task of psychotherapy is to locate elements which might be added to or developed within an individual’s repertoire in order to restore the self’s
ability for growth and stability. This normative approach may be of particular salience for Veteran’s who have been awakened to their capacity for harming others in a way previously unthinkable to themselves. For such Veterans there is no turning back the clock – no unseeing or unknowing unspeakable things within themselves. Consequently, therapeutic approaches to moral injury may be better served by elaborating the soldier’s existing repertoire in order to open paths for the Veteran to pursue a more progressive and robust dialog among voices in their repertoire. The first step in such a task will likely be the formation of a dialogical space in which reorganization of the dialogical self might occur. Although the importance of empathy, interpersonal warm and non-judgment are well-documented conditions for psychological growth generally, these elements take on special importance in the context of moral injury.

Dewey (2004), reflecting on his initial hesitation to explore fully the moral injuries of his Veteran clients, identified his core fear as someday discovering that there was no story so horrific that he could not envision himself engaging in exactly the same actions. Dewey reports that until he recognized and accepted this possibility on a personal level, he was limited in his ability to empathically support his morally injured clients. Thus, the creation of dialogical space in the context of moral injury requires that the clinician first also confront his or her own destructive capacities and inclinations. This includes clinicians becoming aware of their own internal positions, which in the past may have advocated for or even undertaken malicious actions in violation of the clinician’s moral conscience. Next the tension these malicious acts did or would have created with the clinician’s own external repertoire (i.e. family, friends, community members) might be remembered or imagined in order to experience some degree of the guilt, shame and alienation that accompanies severe violations of moral conscience. Without taking the time and effort to fully sense and acknowledge these tensions within themselves, clinicians may be at risk for inadvertently mimicking existing cultural voices that are naively ignorant of their own capacity for evil, thereby further contributing to the Veteran’s sense of social alienation.

It must be said that such professional awareness in no way qualifies the therapist to speak authoritatively about military trauma. Nonetheless, as the clinician is also represented within the Veteran’s dialogical self, it is crucial that the clinician’s position create a space in which both good and evil can exist simultaneously. Such opening of space allows the therapist to serve as a bridge or meeting place to initiate dialog with the repertoire positions most affected by moral injury. The formation of this space presents itself as perhaps the most precarious stage of therapy as the asymmetrical tensions between the Veteran’s positions may predispose the Veteran to intense shame, anger, anxiety and defensiveness (Singer, 2004). It is therefore important that clinicians seeking to engage Veterans on the topic of moral injury do so on an invitational basis, with deference to the Veteran’s judgment about whether it is appropriate to proceed. If
the Veteran is willing, therapy can attempt to create new dialogical positions to re-
stabilize the Veteran’s self.

The therapeutic formulation of new dialogical positions has been described by
Hermans and Hermans-Jansen (2004) and includes a cyclical process of attending,
creating and anchoring. Once a Veteran has requested or accepted the invitation to
receive services, the clinician may assist the Veteran in attending to the various
positions, which are invested in, or have been influenced by the moral injury. These
may include positions involving the Veteran’s internal repertoire such as “I as soldier,”
“I as American,” or “I as son/father.” Positions within the external repertoire are likely
also to be relevant, such as “my brothers in arms,” “my child,” “my wife” or “my God.”
Finally, cultural voices (i.e., political, military or religious institutions) may also be
identified as germane to the Veteran’s moral injury. In this process of identification, the
narratives associated with the various internal and external positions can be evoked, told
and retold as they are brought in contact with one another. Clinicians may need to pay
special attention to whether the traits of the soldier-hero or the masculine monster figure
prominently in the Veteran’s narratives, as this may indicate a maladaptive asymmetry
between I-positions. Although Veterans may not utilize these specific labels, positions
that sharply divide the moral and immoral (e.g., hero, evil, inhuman, etc.) may reflect
these underlying cultural myths.

A natural outgrowth of this eliciting of positions and narratives may be the
development of a metaposition. Metapositions act as observer positions, which allow
individuals to see themselves as an actor in a given situation (e.g., viewing combat
experiences from a third person perspective). In the context of moral injury, metapositions may have the beneficial effect of creating distance from distress by
removing the Veteran from positions associated with the commission or witnessing of
violent acts. A metaposition can also serve the valuable function of allowing the
Veteran to perceive the relationships between several positions and link them with
historical and cultural voices. This may include the Veteran identifying elements of the
hero myth, which may have been impressed on him by his male peers, military training
or male role models. In all these functions, the development of a metaposition further
increases the dialogical space available for reorganization of the self.

Next, drawing from the Veteran’s elicited positions, the clinician may attempt to
bring to the foreground and affirm positions associated with the pain and regret of moral
injury. This may include grieving for the enemy that was killed or experiencing sadness
at the senseless conditions created by war. Such efforts are likely to be a formidable
challenge for many Veterans, as the experience and communication of such vulnerable
self-states defy the norms of heroic and militarized masculinity (Lorber, 2010).
However, the Veteran’s struggle with this very process may itself provide an
opportunity for the addition of internal positions that allow for a re-stabilization of the
dialogical self (Farnsworth & Sewell, 2012, Singer, 2004). Importantly, the emotions of
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grief and regret may create a sense of dialog between the Veteran’s morally injured internal positions and the external positions still inhabited by the memories of those killed or mistreated by the Veteran in war. Consider, for example, the following letter, written by a Vietnam Veteran and left at the Vietnam memorial in Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

For twenty-two years I have carried your picture in my wallet. I was only eighteen years old that day that we faced one another on that trail in Chu Lai . . . Why you didn’t take my life I’ll never know. You stared at me for so long, armed with your AK-47, and yet you did not fire. Forgive me for taking your life. I was reacting just the way I was trained, to kill V.C . . . So many times over the years I have stared at your picture and your daughter, I suspect. Each time my heart and guts would burn with the pain of guilt. I have two daughters myself now . . . I perceive you as a brave soldier defending his homeland. Above all else, I can now respect the importance that life held for you. I suppose that is why I am able to be here today . . . It is time for me to continue the life process and release my pain and guilt. Forgive me, sir (Allen 1995, as quoted in Spector, 2008, pp. 87).

In this letter, the Veteran has attempted to build upon his re-humanization of the enemy by restoring to the other man a full sense of dignity and valor in his own right. Importantly, the Veteran’s acknowledgment of the enemy as a fellow warrior and father both suggest that reconciliation has taken place within the context of their shared masculinity. In emotionally approaching and contacting his enemy as one man to another, this Veteran both enables himself to ask forgiveness for his actions and to carry his own narrative forward (Shay, 1994). Other strategies for reorganization of the morally injured self may include introducing alternatives to the soldier-hero/masculine monster dichotomy. Such positions may draw on more physically neutral male cultural figures, such as the experienced sage or the disciplined pacifist, which allow both the noble intentions of heroism and the horrific realities of combat to simultaneously exist within themselves. As new positions are created and explored, the Veteran can be encouraged to develop practices that gradually introduce the new voices into their daily lived experience. After the Veteran gains practice speaking from them and listening with them as they interact with their social contexts, the positions can be altered and refined so as to maximize their practical usefulness.

In the last stage, anchoring, the newly formed positions are practiced and rehearsed so they become stable features of the Veteran’s repertoire. Activities that might facilitate this practice include journaling, attendance of Veteran’s support groups, involvement in organizations that represent the Veteran’s values, and the development of personal rituals to concretely represent newly developed positions within his daily routine. Inherent within the concept of anchoring is the understanding that the Veteran
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will likely revisit the themes of moral injury throughout their lifetime as they continue to grapple with the disappointments and imperfections of human choices. Thus, any long-term comprehensive healing from moral injury necessitates that the Veteran develop and maintain inner dialogs which can encompass and contain the reality of ongoing moral failures in civilian, as well as military, contexts.

Finally, the dialogical self also has implications for military-related moral injury that extend into the public sphere. Because a culture can itself be present within the dialogical self as a fully developed voice, cultures likewise play an active role in the Veteran’s recovery process. Of primary concern here is the way in which a society’s dominant culture and the Veteran’s more immediate culture construct discourses about masculinity and the morality of the Veteran’s actions in combat. Muruzábal (2008) suggests that instances of fear towards Veterans as hyper-violent monsters is in part a reflection of American culture’s own subconscious guilt and subsequent distancing from its responsibility to feel and face “the shadiest aspects of its history and facts” (p. 24). Prevention of the harm caused by the morally pristine soldier-hero and the irredeemable masculine monsters thus may require American culture to more broadly recognize its own complicit role in failing to educate its young men about the realities of warfare, thus making them more vulnerable to moral injury. Without such recognition, the continued use of exaggerated hero metanarratives which neatly polarize the human capacities for good and evil will continue to place Servicemen at risk for destabilization of the self when confronted with the moral ambiguities of war.

Conclusion

The mythological hero figure has historically provided cultures with both a sense of protection from outside threats as well as an idealized referent to socially revere. It has also been observed that in western cultures the hero figure’s qualities of strength, stoicism, and physical dominance of threats have aligned with both hegemonic masculine and military ideals. The mutually reinforcing convergence of masculine and militaristic traits has resulted in the figure of the soldier-hero, who nobly uses physical aggression to subdue enemy threats to the hero’s own culture. However, the narratives and experiences of numerous Veterans attest to the limitations of the soldier-hero figure for grappling with the morally vexing realities of war. The term “moral injury” reflects in part the psychological wounds created by acts of war that violate deeply held standards of conscience, and in so doing also disrupt the Veteran’s preferred personal identities and narratives.

In the foregoing article, a preliminary attempt has been made to portray how moral injury in male Veterans can in part be understood as the rapid reorganization of the soldier’s self so as to be confronted with the humanity and masculinity of his victim, after having already engaged in a morally injurious act. To this end, the accounts of morally injurious experiences of Veterans were drawn upon to demonstrate how Hubert
Hermans (2003) theory of the dialogical self can provide a useful framework for understanding the effects of military-related moral injury on the male Veteran self. As only an initial attempt to describe the nature of moral injury on male Veterans, future works should apply more rigorous and systematic methods of qualitative analysis to the experiences of male Veterans grappling with moral injury. Additionally, much thought and research remains to be done in understanding other domains of moral injury. Others (Litz et al. 2009; Shay, 1994) have noted that moral injury can also occur from witnessing morally offensive acts of others in war. Additionally, the moral injuries of female Veterans are also of concern, as Servicewomen are increasingly being exposed to combat and other morally challenging dimensions of war (Owens, Herrera, & Whitesell, 2009). Further work is required to understand what differences may distinguish these forms of moral injury from those discussed in the preceding sections of this article. Such continuing work is important both for the individuals who participate in war and for their families, communities and the cultural groups in which they exist. War, by its very nature, is a communal act (Brock & Lettini, 2012). Consequently, the responsibility for creating, sustaining, and preventing the conditions within which war-related moral injury occurs is a culturally shared responsibility. In understanding how cultural myths and values enable war and endanger the selves of Service members, there is hope that new discourses might be formed to prevent the heavy burden of moral injury from falling on future generations of soldiers and civilians alike.

References


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BOOK REVIEW

Hubert J. M. Hermans & Thorsten Gieser (Eds.)
_Handbook Of Dialogical Self Theory_
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press

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The *Handbook of Dialogical Self Theory*, published in 2012 and edited by Hubert J. M. Hermans and Thorsten Gieser, is worthy of note because of the psychological portrait of the human being which it proposes. Psychology incessantly seeks an adequate model of the human psyche, and the dialogical self-theory concept aspires to the status of a bridging theory. As such, it successfully links quite separate fields and introduces a conceptual apparatus that promises to meet the substantial demands of the interdisciplinary study of the human psyche during a crisis of ever-increasing specialization and the fragmentation of science.

The editors of this work are among the leading representatives of narrative psychology and creators of dialogical self theory (DST). In this work from the subdiscipline of narrative psychology, Hermans and Gieser do refer to social group relations and dynamics, but only in order to show that dialogicality is a characteristic of the self system constituted by the multiplicity of *I*-positions. The authors set three goals: to systemize DST, describe its multifaceted nature, and present the many contexts for its application. First, dialogical psychology as a new subfield requires systemization and specification of terminology; the authors undertake this task in the first chapters of the book. Second, the book edited by Hermans and Gieser is a rich and comprehensive collection of dialogical self theory concepts, described in over 500 pages. Third, the collection of studies presented by Hermans and coauthors present varied contexts of application as well as differing approaches of researchers from numerous academic centers. Some of the studies described are completely innovative propositions for the application of DST, studies which explain the phenomena of acculturation or refer to traditional healing methods, as cases in point. Such studies testify to the fact that DST has been a source of inspiration for contemporary researchers. While reading this book,

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we become familiar with the works of 46 authors of a variety of cultures and academic traditions, all of whom are exploring the dialogical *self*.

This study has been published by Cambridge University Press in a series of textbooks and represents the fruit of two decades of development of DST. Of particular value is the fact that the authors represented are from Africa, India, Japan and China, in addition to traditional, Western centers of science. They also include the Polish school of researchers of the dialogical self, who have had a significant share in the development of DST-based methods. This multitude of approaches and perspectives speaks to the openness of the editors and also to the fact that contemporary science is edging its way toward the golden age of globalization. The works of Hermans and his coauthors demonstrate that psychology must be open and creative, and that it is inherently culture bound. The reviewed work additionally convinces us that the dialogical self concept is alive and developing.

Who are the target readers of this book? It merits use as an academic textbook on DST. It should be of interest to the academic community, as it depicts the methodological status of the conception of the *self*, moving beyond mere speculation. Due to the numerous perspectives and applications of DST, the work will interest “humanists,” including anthropologists, linguists, sociologists, psychologists, psychotherapists, psychiatrists, doctors and even business psychologists—those who accept the assertion that the human psyche is socially constructed while also marked by dialogicality and polyphony. Authors of individual chapters use a clear and lively style, so the concepts described will interest even those readers unfamiliar with the topic.

The editors aspire to verify the theoretical concept of the dialogical self, and simultaneously defend it, by convincing the reader that it is not just one more interesting, philosophy-based metaphor for “internal voices” but an empirically-based theory. The work promises to familiarize us with the origins of the assumptions, applications and empirical verification of dialogical self theory. The authors lead the reader though chapters describing the polyphony of the self, as grounded in philosophy and literature. Hermans derives inspiration from the philosophy of dialogue as well as *belles-lettres* to describe the core traits of the *self*.

This collection of works edited by Hermans and Gieser is organized into three sections: theory, research and methods, and applications. In the 12 chapters of the first section, theoretical assumptions (although some chapters do not entirely share this quality), main concepts, and issues related to developmental, socio-cultural and clinical aspects of dialogical self theory are discussed. Hermans clearly and concisely presents the root of the concept, tracing the historical and philosophical origins of the idea to James and Bakhtin, Mead and Buber. His first chapter is a key to the ones that follow, as it presents many important distinctions and nuances in the web of cornerstone ideas for the dialogical self conception, including the personal and social self, homogeneity
and heterogeneity of the self, spatial and temporal *I-positions*, dialogicality and monologue, freedom and limitations of the I function. Hermans’ conception relates to the symbolism of social relations and positions which can appear in the self-consciousness of the individual. These are analogous to the set of live positions that might exist, for example, in a film or novel, where each of the internal voices has its own story to tell. Hermans’ descriptive language makes the theory accessible, even to non-psychologists. In the chapter authored by Barresi and Bertau issues related to the development of the dialogical self in the period of infancy and first years of life are presented. The authors focus on the developmentally important distinction between *I* and *not-I* (self and not-self) as well as *meta-position* and *I-position*, conditioned by the development of language and the awareness of one’s body. Valsiner and Cabell attempt to describe the abstract process of *self-making* as a type of synthesis for which dialogical *self* is the catalyzing space, as it emerges in the process of continual negotiation and renegotiation. Successive chapters of the first section present DST in the context of the multicultural challenges of the contemporary world, including problems of acculturation, among others. These phenomena also have deep implications at the psychological level of the individual and their cultural identity. Van Meijl’s article leads the reader through a process of negotiating cultural identity by the residents of Polynesia; then other authors use the language of DST to describe the phenomenon of acculturation of immigrant residents in the US. The question of the identity of “who am I as a representative of a culture or cultures” is related to the repertoire of voices and cultural positions that can exist in the universe of the *self*. The chapter authored by Verhofstadt-Denève discusses the roles and limitations of DST in the analysis of intra- and interpersonal processes stimulating reflection on one’s own self in the process of dialogue during psychodrama. Surgan and Abbey analyze the process of hybridization during the creation of the *self* system and the *third position*. Hevern depicts the degree to which anonymity and isolation marked by communication on the Internet instill dialogical activity in the sphere of the *self*. Paul and John Lysaker analyze and review the polyphonic nature of the *self* in DST in the area of psychiatry and mental disorders, in particular the issue of identity in schizophrenia. In the last chapter the reader learns of the relational and dialogical character of traditional methods of therapy used in Africa, in confrontation with the Western tradition.

The second section of the book relates to methodological aspects of DST, as illustrated by qualitative as well as quantitative studies on the dialogical and polyphonic self. It is worth noting that one half of the authors of this section are Polish researchers. Oleś and Puchalska-Wasyl present aspects of the dialogical self in the context of character traits, based on the results of research using their own test scale for the activity of internal dialogues. Żurawska-Żyla and her team use DST in an analysis of literary texts and propose a typology of authors based on differences in their relationships to the protagonists of their novels. Stemplewska-Żakowicz and coauthors
describe a series of experiments aimed at verifying DST and analyzing cognitive aspects of individual *I-positions*, with their particular ways of viewing the world. The chapter authored by Nir takes a closer look at the process of internal negotiations in the framework of *I-positions* up close, analyzing stages and methods of constructive solution of an internal conflict. Gonçalves and Ribeiro describe the opportunities to apply DST and the technique of internal narration as well as the stages of paving new, adequate ways of viewing and understanding oneself and the world in the process of psychotherapy. The last chapter, under the authorship of Jasper and coworkers, contains a critical discussion of methodological issues and a classification of techniques used in research based on DST.

The third section of the book discusses applied issues in psychotherapy, education, emotion work and consumer behavior. Rowan depicts the advantages of the cognitive apparatus of DST in a description of the dynamics of phenomena which emerge during psychotherapy. In the following chapter, Dimaggio describes the particularities of disorders in the area of intra- and interpersonal dialogue, giving examples of ways to reorganize these dialogues in the psychotherapy process. Neimeyer shows to what degree DST may be helpful when offering support for those facing dying and death. In the next chapter, Morioka discusses the concept of *ma* in the Japanese culture and points to operating in the dialogical space of DST as an important factor in therapy. Ho in his chapter focuses on the connection of dialogue and action and the weight of these relations in the problem-solving process. The chapter authored by Hermans-Konopka discusses the dynamic nature of the *self*, the defining characteristic of which is continuous change. The chapter shows how DST is used in work on emotions in coaching, as one example. In her work on the impact of DST in education, Ligorio pays attention to the limitations of the classical cognitive approach, highlighting the input of DST in the development of the identity of students and teachers and the student-teacher relationship. Winters and her coworkers bring DST to the sphere of student career planning, the development of an awareness of career paths, by stimulating internal career dialogue. Bahl closes with an applied section, pointing to the role of the dialogical concept in understanding the behavior of consumers, whose preferences condition the specific repertoire of the *self* narrative.

Is there anything to be said against this work? Editors Hermans and Gieser claim that the nature of the *self* is inseparably connected with the embodied experience of dialogicality as rooted in the social environment. Some chapters are characterized by a large degree of speculation, metaphoricity and difficulty in verification of some assumptions. A careful read of the chapters devoted to theoretical issues may give the impression that while DST seems clear and intuitive, submerging oneself in the concept leaves one with the sense of navigating at a level of overwhelming abstraction. In comparison with other similar concepts, DST comes up short because of its complex language of new ideas used to describe and explain the human *self*. It is difficult not to
notice certain analogies to the concept of Transactional Analysis of Eric Berne, i.e., the three main ego states, the conception of position, scripts, roles and internal self-speech, or transaction. The Karpman Drama Triangle applied by Berne is a simpler but clearer concept. While DST has its own specific features and methodological status, it is a conception that requires further development in the direction of greater consolidation and generalization in the area of the numerous new and excessively provisional neologisms used. Particularly valuable are the attempts to systematize and define basic concepts presented in several chapters, such as the glossary of key terms presented by Raggatt, descriptive definitions and distinctions, e.g. positioning phenomenon (I-position, counter-position, meta-position, and third position), which also depict the development of theories connected to the dynamic processes of mediation, centralization and decentralization of the self positions. The concepts described by Hermans and Gieser require readers to master the complex and refined conceptual apparatus as a passport for travel in the world of the dialogical self. DST theory transports us into a unique world with its own language, thanks to which we come to see familiar objects in a new way. It is a language that is obligatory, in keeping with the maxim – to which DST has certain privilege – When in Rome, do as the Romans do.

To conclude, the conception presented in this edited work, based on the metaphor of conversation and minisocieties, has inspired researchers working on social, cultural and clinical psychology issues. The collection of publications compiled in this book indicates how DST allows various phenomena to be articulated in a new way, including schizophrenia, psychodrama, therapy and intercultural contact. The many authors of this work stress the fact that dialogical self theory crosses the boundaries of the “here and now,” and gains new explanatory power beyond many other theories.