REPRESENTING THE VAGUENESS WITHIN THE DIALOGICAL SELF: PRESENCE AND ABSENCE OF THE OBJECT IN BETWEEN SELF AND COMMUNITY

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Abstract. In this paper, I try to enrich both the social representation theory (SRT) and the dialogical self theory (DST) by integrating the concepts of *vagueness* and *boundary case* borrowed from modern philosophy. These concepts are linked to SRT and DST through an illustration based on the analysis of stakeholders (professionals from the school and other community organizations) discourses in a Canadian partnership program.

Keywords: dialogical self, social representation, vagueness, boundary case, school-family relationship

In this paper, I will try to enrich both the social representation theory (SRT) and the dialogical self theory (DST) by integrating the concepts of vagueness and boundary case borrowed from philosophy. This is done by first showing how the recognition of vagueness is missing in both theories by expressing their limits and by providing examples relating to the relationship between school and community (including family) in a context of impoverished families in the Quebec area in Canada. Then, with respect to our type of argumentation and narration, I will switch from a critical to a descriptive approach by presenting the concepts of vagueness and boundary case. I will link them to SRT and DST through an illustration based on the analysis of stakeholders (professionals from the school and other community organizations) discourses in a Canadian partnership program. I will conclude by referring to the concept of open texture as applied to space and time.

From Points to Holes in Contexts Involving Uncertainty: Vagueness and Transitional Zone

Even if both DST and SRT recognize, to varying degrees, that the socio-cognitive environment of the person is *uncertain*, they also identify some *clear* points of reference—*anchor* (and objectified content) and *position*, respectively—that are

partially stable entities involving the entification of reality. In the case of the DST, the "repertory of the Self" partially entails a static conception of culture (Adams, 2001) as with other concepts or complexes such as "repertory of practice" (Gutierrez & Rogoff, 2003), "community of practice" (Lave & Wenger, 1998) and "funds of knowledge" (Moll & Diaz, 1989). Yet, Hermans (2001*a*) opposes himself to entity concepts such as set and typology.

Both in DST and SRT, the entities are located in a space demarcated with *clear* boundaries.


Figure 1. Repertory of the Self[1]

Figure 1 illustrates the "repertory of the Self" (DST) containing tick marks representing the clear positions that are well delimited in the environment. The size of the points symbolizes their salient nature. Some are in the centre and others in the periphery. Whether fully or partially permeable, the boundaries imply a clear demarcation of the points situated on the map of the Self. What happens if I add holes (empty points) in this schematic representation of the dialogical self (DS)? What does the background, that is, the blank space, symbolizes? What is invisible?

There is a parallel issue present in SRT. In an apparent logic, the social representation processes—anchoring and objectivation—suggest the fitting of tick structures (anchors) with objects, the new ones (the unfamiliar, the psychoanalyst in the study of Moscovici, 1961) having to be objectified with respect to anchors (certain *clear*

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[1] From Hermans (2001*a*, p. 252).

domains like religion) that are *already present*—before the arrival of the object from the external world, that is, the science in Moscovici's study—in the environment. The emphasis is on making *present* the absent object. So, the uncertain and vague absent object coming from the external world—for instance, when the French population heard for the first time about Freud and the psychoanalytic theory (Moscovici, 1961)—has to be objectified and anchored, thus made present and clearly circumscribed. One of the functions of social representation is to maintain and create such delineation:

> This invisibility is not due to any lack of information conveyed to the eyeball, but to a pre-established fragmentation of reality, a classification of the people and things which comprise it, which makes some of them visible *and the rest invisible*. […] In each of these cases we note the intervention of representations which either direct us towards that which is visible and to which we have to respond; or which relate appearance and reality; *or* again which define this reality (Moscovici, 1984, pp. 4-5).[2]

In the last sentence of this excerpt, Moscovici places social representation to a large extent in a reductionist paradigm based on an "either/or" logic because the clear choice (between making present or absent) potentially entails the exclusion of the aspects not chosen.


Figure 2. The Choice of Making the Object Absent or Present Based on a Reductionist ("Either/Or") Logic

Figure 2 symbolizes this clear delineation of the environment. In the study of the penetration of psychoanalysis (as a system of ideas) in the French population (Moscovici, 1961), the outside is clearly outlined and contains what is absent and not yet present. To be represented, the stranger has to appear as present in the internal world. To take a contemporary example, in a poor area, parents are generally absent in school, but teachers need them to support the children's academic success. Making the parent present allows the teachers to familiarize themselves with him or her (Boulanger, Larose, Couturier, Saussez & Grenier, 2014).

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[2] The emphasis (italics) is mine.

While Moscovici focuses on the clear delineation of space, he considers that after moving in the internal zone, the object is *at the same time* there (present) *and* not there (absent).

> He may experience this sense of non-familiarity *when frontiers and/or conventions disappear*; when distinctions between the abstract and the concrete become blurred; or when an object, which he had always thought of as abstract, suddenly emerges in all its concreteness, etc. This may occur when he is presented with […] any *atypical behaviour*, *person or relation* which might prevent him from reacting as he would before the usual type. He *doesn't find what he expected to find*, and is left with a sense of *incompleteness* and randomness. It is in this way that the mentally handicapped, or people belonging to other cultures, are disturbing, because *they are like us, and yet not like us*; so we say they are '*un-cultured'*, 'barbarian', 'irrational' and so on (Moscovici, 1984, p. 25).[3]

Moscovici explains the simultaneity of the two qualifications of the object, that is, its presence and its absence, by the paradoxical fact that the presence (near to me, in my environment) of the object makes its absence (what contrasts with my anchors, with the conventions of this environment) apparent. While the stranger is present and absent at the same time, let's insist on the fact that he or she is "not yet like us" (ibid.), which means that he or she has to be or become like us. Some characteristics of the object (a person in the case we are discussing) are rejected because they are *made absent* with respect to what is already present (the conventions) in the environment of the subjects receiving this object. In Moscovici's study, the strangers are uncultured like the parents, who, after showing up at school, are generally represented as incompetent. While in the last excerpt, Moscovici refers to *the suspension of clarity* of the object and its boundary, the process at stake indicates a quick *resolution* of this lack of clarity through a *clear* demarcation signalling an "either/or" logic.

The choice is clear: the emphasis is on making the object present (keeping *present what fits* and suits me) with respect to already present conventions.

> Which means that we are never provided with any information which has not been distorted by representations 'superimposed' on object and on persons which give them a certain *vagueness* and make them partially inaccessible (Moscovici, 1984, p. 6).[4]

While, in general, Moscovici focuses on the (quick) resolution of vagueness, in this excerpt, he admits that it *remains* vague. Yet, the logic is the same: vagueness does not come from the object, but from the superposing (clear and already present)

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[3] The emphasis (underligning) is ours.
[4] The emphasis (italics) is mine.

conventions that render absent some of its properties that are invisible and not seen. The stranger is seen *as he or she must be* seen, with respect to conventions. The point of placing the object at the boundary—when he or she is at the same time present and absent—is to select specific characteristics that fit with the conventions so that the strange characteristics are rejected, at least, the ones that do not fit. For example, in a poor area, the informal aspect of learning at home is generally unseen and so not represented (Boulanger, 2016).[5] In this sense, the *boundaries* remain *present* and *clear* all the time; the space is cut in three zones: the external (where the absence lies) and internal worlds and the boundary between them. This demarcation entails the risk of keeping the strange aspect outside and absent.

Regarding DST, Hermans and Hermans-Konopka (2010) provide an interesting asset with which to answer this challenge. They situate the object and the person (the *alter*; the parent from the point of view of the teachers) in an extended landscape of the Self, in a *transitional field* composed of objects (called abjects) that are *at the same time* present and absent.

> [It is] a field of transition between internal and external, where an individual knows at some level of consciousness that the "bad guy" is part of the internal domain *and at another level* that this position is part of the external domain. Moreover, these results suggest the existence of a dynamic self that allows, *under special conditions*, the movement of an enemy-other from the external to the internal domains of the self. If this happens, there is a chance that the abject-other, rather than being silenced or excluded, becomes an accountable voice in the polyphony of the self (p. 44).[6]

The object that is both present and absent (the hidden part of the Self)—in this circumstance the object is called the abject—can thus move from one position (present and absent) to another *in* the extended environment. Moreover, although secondary in their overall presentation, the vagueness and ambiguity of this field is mentioned by Hermans and Hermans-Konopka (2010):

> Some *I*-positions are located in the vague and ambiguous border-zone between self and non-self which can be characterized as "identity-in-difference (Gregg, 1991), that is, they belong and do not belong to me *at the same time* (p. 162).

Albeit very useful for the purpose of my paper, these avenues, particularly relative to the last excerpt, seem for a large extent ground in an environment composed of well-outlined boundaries (Figure 1) since the present position is assigned to one level

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[5] I will identify two illustrations of what I mean by selecting an object by situating it at the boundary. Parents coming to school have to go to the secretary office (boundary near the open door) in order to be oriented in X or Y school zones regarding school conventions. International travellers have to stop at the customs office where their luggage will be selected in regard to local conventions.
[6] The emphasis (underlining) is mine.

and the absent to another level. So, this field is not vague or, at least, it does not remain so for a long time as with Moscovici's analysis.

An example provided by Hermans (2001*b*) is a mother meeting her daughter's friend for the first time and comparing her to Peter, the daughter's brother. She anchors (SRT) and positions (DST) this unfamiliar but visible and thus accessible (to her and to the researcher) object with respect to Peter, a position that is already present. The excerpt below describes how the dialogical dynamic ends up:

> From a theoretical point of view, the two external positions are 'functionally equivalent', which means that they evoke, consciously or unconsciously, the same pattern of internal positions. The two internal positions, in turn, are also functionally equivalent as they are both directed toward the same pattern of external positions. In other words, patterns of internal and external positions emerge from person-world interactions (Hermans, 2001*b*, p. 325).

So, while the DST is characterized by innovation, the emphasis here is based on what is *already present* in the environment. In this way, the distinction between absence and presence is clear—or made clear, which suggests the quick resolution of uncertainty as in Moscovici's analysis—and the stranger is made "*functionally equivalent*" (ibid.)[7] in the same way as the object the members of the French population in Moscovici's study receive has to *fit* their anchors (what is present before the arrival of the stranger).

Both Moscovici and Hermans perceive that the stranger (e.g., a traveller or a parent showing up at school) runs the risk of being represented as uncultured, as not yet like us. While these authors, in particular the latter, partially develop a dynamic conception of space and promote both going into the uncertainty and confronting the strangeness and unfamiliar, the underlying clear and well-demarcated space potentially reinforces certainty and thus possibly restrains the dialogical confrontation with the stranger as a condition of innovation. While the DST allows me to see social representation as a transitional zone, vagueness is still missing.

Yet, I need here to explore a third and *strange theoretical world* to borrow other concepts as tools to mediate and expand SRT and DST in an innovative way; this mediation is the function of a third position (here theoretical) in DST. Through the concepts of vagueness and boundary case, philosophy furnishes complementary tools in this regard, thus permitting the conceptual extensions of both SRT and DST, theories that recognize in some way the uncertainty of space. I don't have space to fully elaborate on the concepts that I borrow from philosophy nor do I want to make a contribution to this field as I am not philosopher. Essentially taking a contextual stance[8] (applied to thinking and communication), I will present in a general way these concepts

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[7] The emphasis (italic) is ours.
[8] For a presentation of the different approaches, read Cook (2015).

by suggesting some complements that they provide to SRT and DST. I will need to move from a critical to a descriptive approach in order to present the concepts that I will apply in another section.

Conceptual Extensions: Vagueness and Boundary Case

While vagueness is still often considered as an instance of irrationality to eradicate (forming noise to eliminate as implicitly shown by SRT and DST's emphasis on clearness), many philosophers (Gaiffman, 2010; Sainsbury, 1990; Shapiro, 2006; Raffman, 1994, 2014) consider that it does not suggest ignorance or not *knowing* (knowing being central to SRT) and deviation, but that it constitutes a core feature of our way of thinking and communicating.

Raffman (2014) expresses well the general idea of vagueness[9] that transcends scientific discord among contemporary philosophers:

> Perhaps the only point on which all theorists of vagueness agree is that vagueness is a form of unclarity—specifically, an unclarity about the boundaries of things. In language, vagueness concerns the extent of a term's application: There is no clear or definite boundary between the items to which the term applies and the items to which it does not (p. 2).

So, vagueness implies unclarity in the application of a term with respect to, at least, two regions (A and B): the internal and external zones in Moscovici's study or the zones of presence and absence.[10] The object located in the gap *between* regions A and B is called a boundary case.

> Words like 'rich', 'heap', 'red' and even 'looks red', are vague. That is, they have blurred boundaries of application: there is no sharp division between cases in which they clearly apply and cases in which they don't. There is, for example, no sharp division between objects that are clearly red and objects that aren't (clearly red), people who are clearly rich and people who aren't (Raffman, 1994, p. 41).

For different reasons pertaining to standard logic (see Raffman, 2014) and to the open nature of vagueness and its environment, we cannot force an object to fit in a particular region by adding artificial criteria that would enable boundaries to apply,[11]

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[9] Vagueness is not equivalent to ambiguity, but Scheffler (1979) characterizes the second as a special case of the former.

[10] For some authors, there is nevertheless a *demarcation* in *three regions*: terms that fall in region A, the terms that fit with region Non-A or B and the terms without boundaries that neither fit in A nor B (Raffman, 2014). Note that C is a default region and does not form an option. If this were the case, there would be a clear boundary and the vague term would fall between region C and a new "blind" area (Gaiffman, 1990).

[11] If such thing happens, as the field of application is still open (a feature of open texture), a transference of ambiguity to other regions will happen (Waismann, 1945).

for instance by fitting parents in school's formal activities while their actions are sometimes neither formal nor informal. In fact, vagueness entails indecision about boundary cases lying between different poles, that is, for my concern, presence and absence (of the parents) in a specific zone (school).

Philosophers place terms (B and C) along an ordered scale[12] with two poles (A and D). They are preoccupied with how the shift happens when placing B and C (two boundary cases) in A or D, knowing that such a switch (from A to D or the opposite when the person hesitates) should happen (since A and D are different), but knowing there is no significant difference between B and C. Imagine ranking bald people where the first one (A) is clearly bald and the last one (the 10th; D) is clearly not bald. Is the fifth (C) bald or not bald? As a boundary case, we can neither say if he or she is bald or not nor if he or she is not bald or not non-bald. But he or she *can* become bald or non-bald, depending on the context (Shapiro, 2006) and on the psychological process (Raffman, 1994, 2014).

Vagueness involves tolerance (Gaiffman, 1990). From the point of view of many philosophers, social actors will tolerate the fact that a person with four hairs (B) and another one with five hairs (C) could both be considered as bald. This is so, thanks to the vague nature of the object and its (*possible*) localization (Shapiro, 2006). The choice is then arbitrary and non-legislative; the *"either/or"* is not a static zone, but *suggests* **possibility**. By mentioning that the choice is not grounded in specific institutional rules (or conventions), authors tend to distance themselves from a "governing view" based on the *certainty* of applying (strict) rules (Raffman, 2014). However, the authors often recognize that vagueness could be culturally and ideologically loaded, as when deciding if a foetus (boundary case) is or is not a person (vague concept). The point is that certain cases are not (yet) determined by practice, representation, and language, even if culturally canalized.[13]

Boundary cases imply hesitation on the part of the subject; these cases are problematic and *polemical*, possibly giving rise to controversy. For this reason, they are always *open*, partly because there is tolerance (even partially) and because the space is open (to the possible, to the not yet explored—invisible—horizons). It is always possible to (re)negotiate how to *position* (DST) or *anchor* (SRT) the object (Shapiro, 2006) and modify how it is *represented* (Raiffman, 1994).

The concepts of vagueness and boundary case, borrowed from philosophy, enable me to describe social representation (SRT)—as an environment (Moscovici,

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[12] The ordering does not have to possess clear gradations nor to be linear (Raffman, 2014), considering his non-transitive nature (Raffman, 1995). The very fact that boundary cases are vague implies that the logic of set and typology ("entity") does not apply (Gaiffman, 1990). In this case, to prevent this "entity" logic, Scheffler (1979) uses an inscriptionnalist stance based on token. In our case, we insist on the zoning of the object with respect to some polarities (Lewin, 1935).

[13] The rules themselves are contradictory (Cook, 2015).

1984) which is more precisely for me (as mentioned earlier) a transitional zone—and the transitional field of the Self (abject; DST) as *vague zones* entailing negotiation and the tolerance of uncertainty. I will illustrate it to make sense of it. Is the parental engagement at the library a case of parents' presence or absence in the school? What if it is neither? And what if it is one *or* the other?

Vague Representational and Transitional Zones of the Self: Application to the School-Community (Including Family) Relationship

I will briefly illustrate the representational and transitional zones of the professionals (actors from school and other institutions intervening with the parents and children) participating in a partnership program (2003-2009) implemented in poor areas in Canada (Quebec) and interviewed in focus groups carried out in 2007.[14] They receive instructions from political agents to develop activities to reach parents. The professionals define these activities through group discussions. I will focus on their representation of the presence versus the absence of the parents in school—or in line with school matters—in relation to parental engagement.

Parental engagement is often represented in a traditional way where engagement equals parent's physical presence in school:

> The parent who is *there* is a parent saying, "Me, I am involved," and who is already engaged at other levels in school. But it's *complicated*. The approaches are outreach approaches. And that's that. But they don't always give results. […] There have been *holes* but we generally almost always have one [parent] (Subject 1).

In this excerpt, the zone of anchoring is related to school positioning in a way that parental school presence is a sign of engagement. The hole that is expressed here symbolizes the absence of the parent. While the demarcation between presence and absence is clear, what is not (complicated) is the way to reach the parents and the results of their presence. One of the vague zones is the engagement of parents as students (returning to school by investing in vocational activities).

> And because at the level of statistics it's been *hard to prove*, me, I know there are parents who have gone back to school. But *is it really related?* Is there really a connection? But, me, I know that there are parents who have chosen to continue their studies (Subject 2).

The absence of proof of parental engagement reflects its vagueness. The two terms in the expression "parental engagement" (the parent and his or her engagement) are vague. The status of the parent is an object of tension in the group. Below, I present a part of the dialogue between two participants in the focus group.

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[14] The analysis is presented elsewhere. For more details, the reader can refer to Boulanger (2016).

It *could* also be a grandparent. They're often in school workshops, they have room, they're on the ground (Subject 3).

I have nothing against grandparents, but *I'm not sure it's the right person to come sit here* because, me, I don't have children in school presently. I'd prefer parents *with children in school* (Subject 4).

Actually, there're many grandparents coming to school to do activities and to replace parents. They're *more involved than we think!* But, of course, if the grandparent has no *link with the school*, they don't necessarily have the best point of view. But there are many grandparents helping school activities by giving them (Subject 3).

The controversy is on the status of the educator representing the child. From the point of view of Subject 3, the status does not depend on the level of family lineage, but on the actor's proximity to school matters. Seeming to become more flexible in the course of the discussion, Subject 4 expands the dialogue mentioning that a parent can engage in another school than the one in which his or her children are officially registered.

Group participants do not agree on the clear demarcation of boundary case, but they *agree to disagree*. The space given to the definition of educator or parent is open to discussion, *re*definition (*re*presentation), and innovation since (yet unseen, invisible) possibilities (using the word "could") are constructed in the dialogues that emerge.

The participants hesitate to define parental presence in school:

They aren't *here*, but it doesn't mean that they're not *happy* or *close to* the school… Happy, *no*, but still closer to the school because they *communicate* better since they *feel* more welcomed, *maybe* (Subject 5).

In this excerpt, the *hesitating* subject admits the *possibility* that proximity to the school not only necessitates *physical* (visible) presence, but also implies the way parents communicate and their feeling of being welcomed. Communication and feelings are tacit (invisible) elements representing the boundary case of parental presence (presence in mind, emotion, and communication). In fact, there is *openness to* boundary cases that *don't fit usual conventions* as also expressed in the following excerpt:

And there it provides an occasion to *see* the school *from another angle*. And it gives them [parents] a place. There are many parents who did not feel well with the school and who came to do *other kinds of acts* in schools compared with being students. I see that it changes their ideas about, and relationship with, the school (Subject 7).

In this excerpt, parents can now engage in the school in more informal ways whereas the professionals do focus on the formal aspect. The informal forms of

engagement are *both possibilities and reality*. Certain participants refer to parental engagement at the community library. Others refer to the informal conversation between teachers and parents in the school corridors (a zone that is not fully *rule-governed*). What was seen as parental absence—more precisely *not seen* as a possible presence, thus expressing blindness to certain zones of the environment (Boulanger, 2016, 2018) or refused forms of engagement—are now seen as possibilities and in some cases constitute current practices (actuality)![15] This is related to the vague nature of some cases that are (re)negotiated.

The third theoretical position that I use in this paper enables me to make sense of the suspension of clarity (Moscovici, 1961) and the vagueness of the transitional field (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010). To this end, I must delve into uncertainty (a principle promoted by DST and associated to dialogicality and post-dialogicality) in a vague environment instead of seeking the quick resolution of this uncertainty in and through a clear demarcation of space. It appears *clear* to me that, in these particular conditions of vagueness, the status of what is present and absent with respect to school is contextually relative and based in discussion as well as, in some cases, debate. My analyses, based on philosophical concepts, enriches the sense of the movement of the abject by situating it in a vague space, in a way that boundary cases *could be* cases of presence or absence, depending on the contextual and psychological dimensions evolving.

The hidden part of ourselves (abject in a transitional field) that is rendered absent and invisible, thus potentially excluded in Moscovici's (1961) theory, is considered a resourceful portion of the Self, as expressed by Hermans and Hermans-Konopka (2010). Moscovici's *moment of* (related to the content of his theory) uncertainty and Hermans and Hermans-Konopka's vague nature of the transitional field—two more or less secondary principles in SRT and DST—are key to being open to the unknown, as the suspension of clarity (Moscovici, 1961) is a fruitful dialogical context.

The process that occurs in a vague environment (recognized as such by the researchers) implies modifying the spatial representation (my extension of SRT using DST) in an innovative way (DST) because what is vague is not excluded but taken as a possibility. As the conception of the parents moving supposes tolerance and authorization of possibilities (not yet seen), the invisible is considered a "*possible actuality*." The hidden part of the parents that would otherwise have been rejected—in particular in the case of SRT—is seen here as a resource. Let's think for instance about informal parental engagement outside of the school. In this perspective, the parents, as

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[15] We can consider that there is here resolution of vagueness, but it does not mean that all that is vague is clear! As the space of vagueness is still open, vagueness is transferred to other domains (Scheffler, 1979; Waismann, 1945)—a phenomenon that we neither demonstrate nor illustrate here—as movement that occurs in the transitional zone of the abject.

abjects, *move* through space and *time*! The parents not only move through (in) the school, but they move at the boundary of the school and the community (including the family)!

Conclusion: Toward Spatiotemporal Openness

I made a first step toward making the dynamic aspect of both SRT and DST *visible* by introducing vagueness. For instance, Moscovici's suspension of clarity does not imply clear demarcation of the space. Precisely because of the suspension of clarity (Moscovici, 1961), vagueness entails not only tolerance to uncertainty and unfamiliarity, but also the exploitation of these uncertain conditions as a way to get beyond what now seems visible to us.

What appears salient in my analysis (illustration provided) is not only that the object appears vague, but that its very space remains open. In this respect, I should push my theoretical development further by introducing the concept of open texture (from philosophy; see Scheffler, 1979 and Waismann, 1945), which expresses the idea of open space (open to the invisible) and time (open to the unknown). It could help me more fully grasp the spatial restructuring of space—for instance, by showing how vagueness is transferred from one domain of the transitional zone of the abject to another—and the orientation toward the future. Grounding the time dimension of open texture in an irreversible conception of time (Bergson, 1907) could also allow me to make sense of (and probably expand) what some philosophers (see for instance Raffman, 2014) refer to as switching (from one vague case to another in a non-linear ordering; from the informal engagement of parents in school to informal meetings at the grocery store).

The concept of open texture supposes that novelty and innovation come from elements of surprise! It is precisely the open nature of space that forms the element of surprise in my analysis, in particular openness to the possible (the not yet visible and the unknown). But to mobilize researchers, this effect must occur in an open space. Yet, as some authors suggest, in SRT (Litton & Potter, 1985) and DST (Adams, 2001) the objects are *transparent*—consciously visible—both to the subjects and to the researchers studying their discourse. Here, to become possible, the not-yet-visible implies the theoretical and epistemological openness of the mind as well as a creative dialogue directed toward the future. However, some zones of parental engagement remain partly invisible in my analysis, for example when parents and teachers meet informally by chance (in an unexpected manner) at the grocery store, the promotion of parents and children *not* going to school (as in the case of children who are being schooled at home by their parents) or the resistance of parents to formal school outreach practice. Further analysis is needed to understand these invisible phenomena that would probably have to be grounded not only in vagueness, but also in invisibility. And yet, could it be a (possible) theoretical case?

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